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On July 4th 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) made
public the condemnation of Brazil for its omission in investigating, prosecuting
and condemning the public agents supposedly liable for the torture and murder
of the journalist Vladimir Herzog. The events took place back in 1975, during the
dictatorship of 1964-1985. After several attempts to move judicial authorities in
the domestic system, the case was taken to the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights and, finally, to the IACtHR. Investigation is now open again in Brazil.
However, as we will demonstrate in the following piece, there is a stark dissent
between Brazilian prosecutors and judges, compromising the possibility of criminal
liability for crimes committed during the dictatorship. The main obstacles come
from judges and courts that continuously refuse to accept the normative force of
International Human Rights Law.
Crimes Against Humanity
The debate on criminal liability for gross violations of human rights and crimes
against humanity is an ancient one in the field of International Human Rights Law.
The concept of crimes against humanity can be found in the discussions about
Nuremberg’s Tribunal jurisdiction and would be confirmed as law by the United
Nations General Assembly resolutions. Even before that, throughout eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, in the context of slavery, or in 1915, in view of the political
condemnation of the Armenian genocide, the term was already familiar by the
international community. One could recall, for instance, the Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
as well as the Resolutions No. 2.712/1970 and No. 2.840/1971, of the UN General
Assembly. Furthermore, the pervasive legal category of such crimes came finally into
existence with the adoption of the 1998 Statute of Rome.
Amnesty Law and the Brazilian Supreme Court
Brazil has a longstanding history in ignoring those principles, be that by its federal
prosecutors (at least until 2011, as we shall see) or by the judiciary. Living a
dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, the military that once ruled depended heavily on
a repressive apparatus that killed, tortured and exiled Brazilian citizens. In 1979,
the approval of Amnesty Law was done with concrete attempts made by General
- 1 -
Figueiredo dictatorship to control the debate and drive the final outcome. The
statutory law, textually, avoided granting amnesty to what the government called
“bloody crimes” at the same time that tried to produce obscurely an auto-amnesty for
crimes committed by public agents when it used the expression “connected crimes”.
By appropriating the pro amnesty discourse promoted by civil society movements
of a “broad, general and unrestricted” amnesty to all crimes committed by political
opponents (be them “bloody” or not), the authoritarian government tried to generate
an ideal of a supposed consensus or political agreement that would involve “both
sides” of the dispute. The fact that armed opposition had been slaughtered by
repression apparatus was extensively ignored. Conservative prosecutors and judges
did not feel abide by the different textual rule of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988.
In the Article 8 of its Transitional Constitutional Provisions Act, the norm granted
amnesty only to those who were affected by the consequences of the dictatorship’s
acts, without any mention that could allow for an auto-amnesty interpretation.
Brazilian Supreme Court and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
In 2010, in a well-known ruling (ADPF 153), the Brazilian Supreme Court maintained
the opinion that there was a political agreement in 1979 and that this should remain
intact. Some Justices such as Gilmar Mendes even supported the idea that the
constituent power managed in 1987-1988 was bound by this supposed political
agreement. The Amnesty Law of 1979 should be interpreted in its supposed
historical meaning, not in a sense determined by the Brazilian Constitution of
1988. This remarkable ruling is seen by the majority of federal courts and judges in
Brazil as the main precedent to be bound by: no public agent has been, until now,
condemned for crimes committed during the dictatorship.
During the same year of 2010, Brazil was held responsible and condemned by the
IACtHR in the Gomes Lund case. Between 1972 and 1975, near 70 partisans of
the Communist Party of Brazil that were developing a guerrilla focus in the northern
Brazilian region of Araguaia were imprisoned, tortured and forced disappeared
by military forces. No criminal liability was ever determined in Brazil, as never the
Armed Forces recognized their crimes. The denial of personal integrity, access to
justice, freedom of expression, access to information were considered by the IACtHR
massive breaches of the American Convention of Human Rights, and the Brazilian
Supreme Court was expressly tried by the regional court.
Prosecutors v. Judges in Brazil
From 2011 on, Brazilian federal prosecutors decided to take a position to make
the Gomes Lund ruling effective in the domestic legal system. The general thesis
was that the Brazilian Supreme Court had jurisdiction in the field of constitutional
review, whereas the IACtHR played a role in the conventionality review. The
interpretation of the 1979 Amnesty Law in relation to the American Convention of
Human Rights could and should be done by the IACtHR. Under such thesis, specific
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working groups were tailored to deal with transitional justice issues. Up to now,
that approach has paved the way to 36 criminal lawsuits brought against public
agents that allegedly committed crimes against humanity during the dictatorship
time (1964-1985). Yet the interpretation that favors reading the Constitution of
1988 in a sense dictated by the Inter-American Human Rights System and against
the auto-amnesty for crimes against humanity has been constantly refused by
Brazilian judges and courts. Only seven rulings were accepted, however reversed
or suspended by superior courts (including the Brazilian Supreme Court) or courts
of appeals. The result is that we do not have, until now, any successful criminal
procedure in Brazil, even after the IACtHR Herzog case described in the following
section.
The Herzog Case
Vladimir Herzog was a journalist that was a member of the Brazilian Communist
Party. He was illegally detained, tortured and assassinated in context of the
Radar Operation, a movement led by the Center of Information of the Army (CIE
– Centro de Informação do Exército) jointly with the DOI-CODI (Destacamento de
Operações de Informação – Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna or Department
of Information Operations-Center for Internal Defense Operations, the organ that
coordinated the repression between military and civilian state forces). The operation
had as a main target the elimination of the members of Brazilian Communist Party.
After the admission by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR)
in 2016 (the procedure before the Commission was initiated in 2009), the IACtHR
delivered its ruling on March 2018 and gained immediate repercussion amongst
international press, civil society and human rights organizations and specialists
worldwide.
According to the IACtHR ruling, a national security doctrine animated the repression
right from the 1964 coup d’état; in March 1970, there was the creation of an Intern
Security System following a Presidential Directive on Intern Security; the DOI-CODI
created the opportunity for joint work involving all security forces; the juridical system
was intentionally structured and organized to avoid future liability of state agents
by excluding the so-called “acts of revolution” (institutional and complementary
acts parallel, contrary and superior to constitutional norms) from judicial review.
The elimination of political opposition and the creation of clandestine centers for
torture, along with the use of this method in a systematic fashion, helped shaping the
widespread nature of the violent repression.
The Court ruled that the UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 1968 only codified
preexisting customary law and ius cogens norms, something that would render
the signature by the Brazilian State needless. Referring to different precedents
from its own case law and from other regional and supranational courts, as well
as the work of the 69th session of the International Law Commission of the UN,
the IACtHR concluded that the ius cogens prohibition on crimes against humanity
proscribe States from invoking statutes of limitation, ne bis in idem norms (double
jeopardy), amnesty or any other clause or legal provision that could avoid criminal
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liability by, for instance, forbidding  prosecutors from charging someone with a crime
committed in a particular period of time. In the end, the decision clearly determines
the investigation, prosecution and, if that is the case, the condemnation of those
involved in Herzog’s death.
Which way ahead?
The Herzog ruling is clearly a step forward comparing to Gomes Lund. By
recognizing the institutional character of the repressive apparatus, it goes beyond
the concept of gross violations of human rights to expressly speaking in terms of
crimes against humanity, as Brazilian prosecutors did. One should also consider that
this understanding was accepted by former General Attorney and by the National
Truth Commission. As we mentioned before, Brazilian prosecutors have already
opened again investigations in the Herzog case. Recently, federal prosecutors also
filed a criminal complaint charging a former police officer and, for the first time, a
former military prosecutor and a former military judge for crimes against humanity
committed during the civil-military dictatorship. But how will Brazilian judges act
now? Contradicting the prosecutors’ general thesis, on the 27th November 2018,
Justice Alexandre de Moraes of the Brazilian Supreme Court gave a glimpse of how
they may insist in the old way of reading the situation. He suspended the criminal
lawsuit that involved the torture of political opponent Espedito de Freitas. The shape
of a conservative and ill aware of the normative dimension of International Human
Rights Law seems to contaminate Brazilian judicial authorities in an enduring way.
Conclusions
In our opinion, as an authoritarian façade grows in the institutional environment in
Brazil, it seems unlikely to have better times for human rights in the next few years.
Brazilian judges will continuously amount to state violations of the obligations that
Brazil accepted once it took part in the American Convention of Human Rights, in
1992, and accepted the IACtHR jurisdiction, in 1998. One should remember that
the same Brazilian Constitution of 1988 establishes the obligation of the Brazilian
state to adhere to an international human rights courts (Article 7 of the Transitional
Constitutional Provisions Act) and to conduct its international relations as to ensure
the prevalence of human rights (Article 4, number II). It does not seem feasible
that the content between prosecutors’ supporters of IACtHR rulings, on the one
side, and judges that rely in the Brazilian Supreme Court ruling of 2010, on the
other side, will be even touched in the next few years by this later tribunal. Without
civil society pressure, it seems that the now President of the Supreme Court will
try to leave things undecided, since he publicly recognized that judicial authorities
should now act like “defenders” instead of “forwards”. By the way, he is the same
that just now called the institutional rupture of 1964 a “movement”, instead of a coup
d’état. Refusing again and again the IACtHR jurisdiction, Brazilian judges make the
Brazilian state an international pariah.
- 4 -
